















This work documents the role investor sentiment plays on the market’s 
mean-variance tradeoff. We find that, during high-sentiment periods, 
investor sentiment undermines an otherwise positive mean-variance 
tradeoff. In low-sentiment periods, the common understanding holds that 
investors should obtain a compensation for bearing variance risk. These 
findings are robust to different stock return indices, variances estimates 
and sentiment measures. We also provide international evidence for five 
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"I'll play it first, and tell you what it is later."  
- Miles Davis 
I. Introduction 
Ever since Markowitz’s seminal work of the 1950s, a tremendous body of finance 
theory and empirical evidence has been developed over the relation between the return on 
an asset and the notion of variance, aiming to solve a dilemma each investor faces: the 
opposing objectives of high return versus low risk. 1 As Ghysels et al. (2005) put it, the risk-
return tradeoff is so fundamental in financial economics that it could be described as “the 
first fundamental law of finance”. In a recent study, Yu and Yuan (2011, YY hereafter) find 
that the sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006, BW henceforth) significantly affects 
the U.S. mean-variance tradeoff. This dissertation builds on both the mean-variance and 
sentiment literature, to ultimately document the impact investor sentiment has on the mean-
variance tradeoff, and provide significant international evidence, in a clear attempt to 
contribute to the existing literature with a more integrated and comprehensive work on the 
link between sentiment, risk and return.  
We revisit the risk-return tradeoff to investigate whether investor sentiment disturbs 
this relation. We find investor sentiment to play an indisputable part on the mean-variance 
relation: our results suggest that sentiment is likely to weaken the connection between the 
conditional mean and variance of returns. The premise of a positive mean-variance tradeoff 
holds when market sentiment is low, but fades away in periods of high sentiment. Our 
results seem consistent with sentiment literature. High-sentiment periods account for greater 
presence of sentiment traders in the market. The greater presence of these sentiment-
                                                        
1 Harry Markowitz was awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics for having developed the theory of 
portfolio choice, published in an essay entitled "Portfolio Selection". 
2 
 
oriented traders can move prices away from rational levels and undermine the expected 
positive mean-variance relation.  
Theories of rational asset pricing often suggest a positive relation between the market’s 
expected return and variance [Merton (1973, 1980)].2 Yet the tradeoff has been hard to find 
in the data and numerous studies find rather mixed empirical evidence on the mean-variance 
relation. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), Ghysels et al. (2005), Guo and Whitelaw (2006), 
Brandt and Wang (2007), Lundblad (2007), and Pastor et al. (2008) find a positive and 
significant relation between the conditional variance and the conditional mean of the stock 
market return. French et al. (1987), Baillie and DeGennaro (1990) and Campbell and 
Hentschel (1992) also find a positive although frequently insignificant relation. Contrarily, 
Campbell (1987), Nelson (1991), Whitelaw (1994), Lettau and Ludvigson (2003), and Brandt 
and Kang (2004) find a significantly negative relation. Turner et al. (1989), Glosten et al. 
(1993), Harvey (2001), and MacKinlay and Park (2004) find both a positive and a negative 
relation depending on the method used. 3  In fact, the results seem highly sensitive to 
methodology as the conclusions on the mean-variance relation proved to be greatly 
influenced by the conditional variance models selected, and thus the evidence we find in the 
literature is still inconclusive.4  
More recently, behaviorists’ theories, departing from rational asset pricing, recurrently 
consider the influence of investor sentiment. BW (2007) define investor sentiment broadly as 
“a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at 
hand”. Whilst classical finance theory leaves no role for investment sentiment, the history of 
                                                        
2 However, Abel (1998), Backus and Gregpry (1993), and Gennotte and Marsh (1993) present models in which 
a negative relation between return and variance is consistent with equilibrium. 
3 See also Pindyck (1984), and Chan et al. (1992). 
4  However, YY (2011) show that after controlling for BW (2006) investor sentiment, the results are 
impressively robust across all the conditional variance models. 
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stock market is full of striking events in which a dramatic level or change in stock prices 
seems to defy explanation. And the standard finance model has presented considerable 
difficulty fitting many of these events. As a result, behaviorists have been working to 
enhance the standard model and present alternatives.  
 There is today a reasonable large and growing literature about investor sentiment, 
particularly fostered since BW (2006, 2007) developed a powerful sentimental index and 
predict that broad waves of sentiment will have greater effects on hard to arbitrage and hard 
to value stocks (e.g. small, young, high volatility, unprofitable, non-dividend-paying, extreme-
growth and distressed stocks). Prior to BW sentiment index, De Long et al. (1990) present a 
model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs 
affect prices and earn higher expected returns. Glushkov (2005) show that sentiment affects 
stocks of some firms more than others due to higher “sentiment beta”. Other papers have 
found evidence for a role of investor sentiment in U.S. stock market returns both in the 
short run [Simon and Wiggins (2001), Brown and Cliff (2004), Qiu and Welch (2004), Kaniel 
et al. (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006)], and in the long run [Brown and Cliff (2005) 
and Yuan (2005)].  
The presence of sentiment investors, with both optimistic and pessimistic expectations 
about the market, is well documented [Lee et al. (1991), Ritter (1991), BW (2006, 2007) and 
Baker et al. (2012)] and its behavior on the financial markets may provide some useful 
context to our results. Empirical studies show that sentiment traders are unwilling to take 
short positions. Barber and Odean (2008) reveal that individual investors, who top the list of 
sentiment traders candidates, “are more likely to buy attention-grabbing stocks than to sell 
them” and document that short positions represent only 0.29% of all positions taken by 
these investors. Since sentiment traders are reluctant to short, they participate more intensely 
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and have a stronger influence in the equity market when the market is optimistic and 
sentiment is high, as they tend to purchase more stocks – other studies enhance this view 
[Karlsson et al. (2005) and Yuan (2008)]. The greater influence of such investors when 
sentiment is high perverts the mean-variance tradeoff. Moreover, sentiment traders are likely 
to be less sophisticated, inexperienced and naive investors and therefore they can 
misestimate variance. Sentiment investors are by definition less prepared than, say, 
institutional investors to understand how to accurately measure risk. This leads them to 
misestimate the variance of returns and consequently misrepresent risk, distorting the      
risk-return relation. These considerations directly support our results. The amplified 
presence and activity of sentiment-driven traders when aggregate market sentiment is high 
should challenge an otherwise positive mean-variance tradeoff in the stock market. 
Not only in the academia have the influence of investor sentiment and the presence of 
sentiment traders been documented. Financial media reports more and more often the 
dynamics between sentiment and the financial markets in their headlines, and the industry 
tries to capture it in their strategies. [e.g. Financial Times on the last U.K. general election, 
April 2015 – “Doubt surrounding the forthcoming election is weighing on investor 
sentiment and increasing volatility in UK.”; Financial Times, November 2012 – “Italy’s 
government borrowing costs have fallen to lows not seen for more than two years, 
highlighting more positive investor sentiment towards the eurozone’s «periphery» 
economies.”; Financial Times on trading and the social media, March 2012 – “Some hedge 
funds have already begun trading strategies based on sentiment on Twitter, such as London-
based Derwent Capital Markets. Researchers at the University of Indiana in 2009 also 
designed an algorithm assessing mood moves on Twitter that could predict a rise or fall in 
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the Dow Jones Industrial Average with 87 per cent accuracy three to four days 
beforehand.”.] 
Our methodology first builds on Yu and Yuan (2011) hypothesis and expands their 
sample. We use BW (2006) sentiment index to identify high- and low-sentiment periods 
through 1965 to 2010. There is a statistically significant and economically important positive 
tradeoff over low-sentiment periods, whereas during high-sentiment periods, the mean-
variance relation appears as substantially weaker and virtually flat. We then conduct the same 
analysis using another widely accepted measure of investor sentiment, the University of 
Michigan’s consumer sentiment index, and the same conclusions apply. 
Following, we test different stock return indices as a proxy for the U.S. stock market 
returns, including the S&P 500 index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average index (DJIA), and 
the Nasdaq 100 index. Additionally, we investigate whether this sentimental affair between 
risk and return is observable in other stock markets, specifically for Canada, Germany, 
France, U.K., and Japan. We use the same U.S. sentiment proxies; our results vary 
considerably depending on the volatility model employed. Whilst for the rolling window 
model we show similar and equally strong evidence of the ability of investor sentiment to 
distinguish the two-pattern risk-return tradeoff, for GARCH-like models, the same 
conclusions do not hold.  
Moreover, we examine if alternative variables other than sentiment yield similar two-
pattern mean-variance outcomes, namely the interest rate, the term premium, the default 
premium, the dividend-price ratio, and the consumption surplus ratio defined in Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999). The results are unequivocal and show that such variables perform 
poorly when compared to investor sentiment. Lastly, we try an asymmetric GARCH (1,1) as 
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an alternative to the standard GARCH (1,1) model, and we conclude both approaches yield 
identical results.   
Subsequent sections are organized as follows. Section II introduces the volatility 
models used and describes thoroughly all data and its descriptive statistics. Empirical results 
are reported in section III. Section IV accommodates the different robustness tests 
performed. Section V concludes this dissertation. 
II. Data and descriptive statistics 
In this section we detail the data we use. We first discuss the importance of accurately 
estimating volatility in our work and introduce the two types of volatility models tested: the 
rolling window model and the GARCH model. Subsequently, we introduce the investor 
sentiment proxies considered in the analysis and then discuss the data set used to compute 
stock market returns. Overall, we used roughly eight primary data sources to conduct this 
dissertation. We use primarily U.S. data, as the United States is widely considered the world’s 
bellwether market and we are constrained by the availability of international data regarding, 
for instance, the sentiment proxies. Yet, we use international data, if available, mainly to 
perform robustness tests. 
A. Volatility models 
The first model we employ is the rolling window (RW) model, which is widely 
accepted as a method to estimate the conditional variance (e.g. French, Schwert, and 
Stambaugh, 1987). This model uses the realized variance of the current month as the 
conditional variance for the next month’s return: 













where rt−d  is the demeaned daily return in month t (obtained by subtracting the          
within-month mean return from the daily raw return), the subscript 𝑁𝑡 is the number of 
trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate number of trading days in one month.  
The GARCH-family models are perhaps the most thoroughly studied volatility models 
in the literature and have been massively used in modeling the volatility of stock market 
returns [e.g. Bollerslev (1986) proposes the GARCH model based on the ARCH model 
developed by Engle (1982)]. 
The second volatility model we use in this dissertation is the GARCH (1,1). In this 
model the conditional variance is modeled as: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡), 
 
(2) 
where Vart(Rt+1)  is the conditional variance and 𝜀𝑡  is the residual, i.e., the difference 
between the realized return and its conditional mean.  
Figure 1 plots the monthly conditional variance for both the RW model and the 
GARCH model from 1965 to 2010. 
 
Figure 1. Realized variance and GARCH variance, 1965-2010. 
The figure presents the conditional variances estimated by the volatility models used, namely the rolling 
window model (dotted line) and the GARCH model (solid line). Due to sentiment data availability, we restrict 
our sample to the period from 1965 through 2010. Please refer to Table 1 for detail on variances’ descriptive 









In order to analyze to which extent investor sentiment is able to affect the standard 
tradeoff between expected returns and variance, it is as critical to accurately measure 
variance as it is to find representative proxies for sentiment and market returns. 
B. Investor sentiment data set 
Our sentiment data set is constrained by the availability of international sentiment 
proxies and cannot employ all those that the predominantly U.S. investor sentiment 
literature has examined. Yet, there are no definitive or uncontroversial measures. We 
measure investor sentiment using the Baker and Wurgler investor sentiment index as our 
main proxy of sentiment. We do use other proxies for investor sentiment as a robustness 
test, and find equally strong results. 
i. Baker and Wurgler (BW) investor sentiment index 
Our first investor sentiment measure is a monthly market-based sentiment series 
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). The BW investor sentiment index is constructed 
based on the common variation in six underlying proxies for sentiment: the closed-end fund 
discount, NYSE share turnover, the number and average first-day returns on IPOs, the 
equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. The authors form their composite 
index by taking the first principal component of these six proxies. The principal component 
analysis filters out idiosyncratic noise in the six measures and captures their common 
component: investor sentiment. To address concerns that each of these proxies for 
sentiment might contain common business cycle information, BW (2006) first regress each 
of the raw sentiment proxies on a set of macroeconomic variables and use the residuals to 
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build the sentiment index. 5 We obtain the sentiment data from Professor Jeff Wurgler’s 
website. Due to sentiment data availability, we restrict our sample to the period from 1965 
through 2010.  
ii. University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index (MCSI) 
We use the monthly University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index (henceforth, 
MCSI) as our second investor sentiment measure. The MCSI is based on the responses 
households give to the monthly Surveys of Consumers, telephone surveys that have been 
conducted at the University of Michigan since 1946, to gather information on consumer 
expectations regarding the overall economy. Consumer confidence indices have been 
broadly used as sentiment indicators in the literature. Carroll et al. (1994), Bram and 
Ludvigson (1998), and Ludvigson (2004) find that consumer sentiment indices forecast 
household consumption. Fisher and Statman (2003) and Lemmon and Portnaiguina (2006) 
relate the consumer confidence indices to security mispricing. Bergman and Roychowdhury 
(2008) investigate how firms adapt their disclosure policies strategically to investor 
sentiment. Schmeling (2009) examines whether consumer confidence affects expected stock 
returns internationally; and Beer et al. (2011) study the relation between investor sentiment 
and stock market crisis. As in the BW index, there are some concerns that the MCSI might 
reflect economic conditions instead of investor sentiment. To ease these concerns we regress 
the monthly index on the same six macroeconomic variables used by BW (2006). We create 
our yearly consumer sentiment index using the yearly averages of the residuals from this 
regression. We obtain the sentiment data from the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Center’s website. For comparison purposes, we restrict our sample to the period from 1965 
                                                        
5  The set includes the industrial production index growth, durable consumption growth, nondurable 
consumption growth, service consumption growth, employment growth, and a dummy variable for NBER 
recessions. More details can be found in the original paper at: http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. 
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through 2010. Figure 2 plots BW and MCSI sentiment indices. 
 
 
Figure 2. BW and MCSI investor sentiment indices, 1965-2010. 
The figure presents the BW composite sentiment index (solid line) and the Michigan survey sentiment index 
(dotted line) from 1965 to 2010. BW index, a monthly market-based sentiment series, is the first principal 
component of six time-series proxies for sentiment. The first proxy is the year-end, value-weighted average 
discount on closed-end mutual funds; the second proxy is the NYSE detrended log share turnover; the third 
and fourth proxies are the annual number and the average annual first-day returns of initial public offerings; the 
fifth proxy is the equity share in new issues; and the sixth and last proxy is the dividend premium. MCSI index, 
a monthly survey-based sentiment series, is the result of the responses households give to the monthly Surveys 
of Consumers, telephone surveys that have been conducted at the University of Michigan since 1946, to gather 
information on consumer expectations regarding the overall economy. To control for macro-conditions, we 
regress both raw indices on the growth in industrial production, the growth in durable, nondurable, and 
services consumption, the growth in employment, and a flag for NBER recessions. Shaded areas denote 
periods designated recessions by the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
BW index captures most of the empirically documented oscillations in investor 
sentiment. After the flash crash of 1962, also known as the Kennedy Slide, investor 
sentiment was low but picked up to reach a peak in the 1968 and 1969 electronic bubble. By 
the mid-1970s sentiment fell and went low but rose again to a subsequent peak in the 
biotech bubble of the late 1970s. Sentiment dropped in the late 1980s but recovered once 
more in the early 1990s, reaching its most recent peak in the Internet bubble. The stock 
market downturn of 2002 made sentiment fall again and kept it low through the early-2000s. 
The mid-2000s represented only a temporary recovery, since sentiment rose until 2006 but 













































investor sentiment went through a modest retrieval period and then remained approximately 
neutral until 2010. Our high-sentiment regime seems to be robust to what we find in the 
literature. Sentiment fluctuations have been previously studied by both empirical and 
academic work and are well documented in the academia. Malkiel (1990), Brown (1991), 
Siegel (1998), Shiller (2000), Cochrane (2003), and Ljunqvist and Wilhelm (2003), all provide 
evidence supporting our high-sentiment periods: the late 1960s, early and mid-1980s, and the 
mid and late-1990s.    
Using the BW index, 22 years (47% of our sample period) are classified as high 
sentiment years; whilst the MCSI index divides the sample in 28 high- and 18 low-sentiment 
years. Our findings suggest the MCSI is a more optimistic measure than the BW index. 
Additionally, in the beginning of our sample, MCSI leaves the flash crash of 1962 behind 
sooner than the BW index, starting the sentiment series with a positive (optimistic) cycle, 
whereas the BW series is initiated with a negative (pessimistic) cycle. In the end of the 
sample period, also, the BW index seems more accurate in perceiving the increasing volatility 
prior to the financial crisis and predicting its arrival, with no clear positive or negative cycle 
and 3 negative years between 2002 and 2007. On the other hand, the MCSI shows no 
predictive power in this period, being positive between 2000 and 2008. Overall, the results 
corroborate the notion that the BW market-based measure is a considerably more accurate 
proxy of investor sentiment than the survey-based measure, the MCSI. 
C. Stock market returns data set 
We use the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted returns as proxies for U.S. stock 
market returns, and the one-month T-bill returns as the interest rate, both available on CRSP 
database. We use these data to compute equal-weighted and value-weighted excess market 
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returns from January 1965 to December 2010, which is the sample period for which we have 
values of BW (2006) sentiment index. The results are based on a sample of monthly data, for 
a total of 552 end-of-the month observations. Figure 3 plots U.S. cumulative excess returns 
from 1965 to 2013. 
 
Figure 3. U.S. equal-weighted and value-weighted cumulative excess returns, 1965-2013. 
The figure presents U.S. equal- and value-weighted cumulative excess returns (dotted and solid lines, 
respectively) from 1965 to 2013. Both indices are constructed upon CRSP equal- and value-weighted returns, 
and the one-month T-bill returns, both available on CRSP database. Please refer to Table 1 for detail on 
returns’ descriptive statistics. Shaded areas denote periods designated recessions by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
The equal-weighted index has been extensively explored in the sentiment literature. 
Theory predicts that small firms will be most affected by sentiment, and hence value-
weighting can obscure the relevant patterns. Contrarily, equal-weighted returns represent an 
excellent and accommodating stage to examine the effects of investor sentiment since they 
are more influenced by those small-cap stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) noticed that small 
stocks tend to be unprofitable and have extreme potential growth, which makes them more 
vulnerable to speculation, and thus extremely attractive to optimists and speculators. 
Additionally, small stocks are less exposed to arbitrage because of their high idiosyncratic 
risk (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002) and their high costs to short sell (Jones and Lamont, 













high costs to sell constrain arbitrage strategies’ profits. The evidence found in this work 
supports the existing literature. However, we also examine the value-weighted index and we 
obtain equally strong results. The impact of sentiment on the mean-variance relation is 
robust across the entire stock data set. 
In Table 1, we present the descriptive statistics of market excess returns, realized 
variance, and GHARCH variance. These statistics point out opposite patterns to both the 
low-sentiment and the high-sentiment regime, regardless of the index used.  
Table  1. Descriptive statistics of monthly stock returns and conditional variances 
The table contains summary statistics of monthly excess returns, monthly realized variance and monthly 
GARCH variance from January 1965 to December 2010. The excess returns are calculated using the returns on 
the NYSE-Amex index and the returns on the one-month T-bill. The realized variance is computed from the 
within-month daily returns. GARCH variance is estimated by the GARCH (1,1) model. 
 
  Excess Returns   Realized Variance   GARCH Variance 
Period Mean Var Skew Kurt 
 
Mean Var Skew Kurt 
 
Mean Var Skew Kurt 
  x102 x102 
   
x103 x106 




Panel A: Equal-Weighted index 
Sample 0.75 0.31 -0.11 4.03 
 
1.52 15.20 8.77 90.10 
 
3.17 3.31 2.27 7.04 
Low sent 1.30 0.32 0.54 4.27 
 
1.25 5.12 6.47 56.49 
 
3.44 4.41 2.06 5.55 
High sent 0.16 0.30 -0.97 3.29 
 
1.82 26.08 7.45 59.85 
 
2.88 1.97 2.09 5.38 
  Panel B: Value-Weighted index 
Sample 0.43 0.20 -0.51 2.14 
 
2.00 18.41 9.07 99.13 
 
2.02 1.11 2.31 6.66 
Low sent 0.65 0.17 -0.07 1.24 
 
1.47 4.01 5.02 36.12 
 
1.98 1.27 2.22 5.44 
High sent 0.20 0.23 -0.77 2.43  2.56 33.58 7.25 58.60  2.06 0.95 2.47 8.91 
 
In the low-sentiment regime, the mean of the equal-weighted returns is 1.30%, much 
higher than its equivalent in the high-sentiment period, which is only 0.16%. This evidence is 
also valid for the value-weighted returns, although the difference is smaller in that case. 
Sentiment literature corroborates this pattern, which is in accordance with the economic 
intuition that high sentiment raises the price and depresses the return. 
The negative skewness of stock returns is much of an established fact in the financial 
literature. Yet, we report some insightful patterns on the role sentiment may play in the 
skewness of these returns (Table 1). Whilst in the high-sentiment periods, our returns sample 
substantiate the common idea of negatively skewed returns (-0.97 for the equal-weighted 
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index and -0.77 for the value-weighted index), in the low-sentiment regime the skewness of 
the returns are positive (0.54 in the equal-weighted index) or even close to zero (-0.07 in the 
value-weighted index).  
According to our intuition, we expect conditional variance to be larger in the high-
sentiment regime, subject to the fact that in high-sentiment periods stock prices are more 
affected by the presence of sentiment traders in the market than in low-sentiment periods. 
Table 1 confirms our argument for realized variance: the mean of realized variance, as well as 
all the remaining moments presented, are substantially higher in the high-sentiment periods, 
suggesting that prices are more volatile in these periods due to the great influence of 
sentiment traders. GARCH variance yields the same characteristics for the value-weighted 
index, but not for the equal-weighted index for which, with the exception of skewness, all 
GARCH variance moments are higher in low-sentiment periods, challenging our intuition.   
III. Empirical results 
In this section we relate investor sentiment, expected returns and variance, eager to 
understand whether and how sentiment influences the mean-variance tradeoff. We test the 
relation between the conditional mean and variance of returns free from investor sentiment 
interference in the equation: 
 𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1, (3) 
being 𝑅𝑡+1  the monthly excess return and 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)  the conditional variance. To 
investigate our claim that this relation is weakened in the high-sentiment periods, we study 
the following two-regime equation: 
 𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1)𝜀𝑡+1, (4) 
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where we incorporated the dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  to account for the high-sentiment regime. 
This means that 𝐷𝑡 equals one if month 𝑡 is comprised in a period of high sentiment in the 
market and zero otherwise. High- and low-sentiment regimes are identified using the BW 
sentiment index: a certain year is classified as a high-sentiment year if the preceding year’s 
sentiment is positive; any month falling in a high-sentiment year is therefore classified as a 
high-sentiment month. In our 1965 to 2010 sample period, 22 out of the 46 years fall into 
the high-sentiment regime, being the low-sentiment regime constituted by the remaining 24 
years. We expect negative 𝑏1 + 𝑏2 and positive 𝑏1. Because high sentiment should attenuate 
the mean-variance tradeoff we expect 𝑏1 + 𝑏2 to be negative. Because sentiment traders are 
barely noticed and have little impact during low-sentiment periods, investors should obtain 
positive compensation for bearing volatility and thus we expect 𝑏1 to be positive. 
A. Mean–variance relation in Rolling Window model 
The rolling window model is the first model we use to estimate variance. Table 2 
reports the coefficients and test-statistics from the regressions with the rolling window 
model as the conditional variance model and the BW sentiment as the sentiment measure.  
The mean-variance relation in the one-regime equation, 𝑏, is -0.39 with a t-statistic of  
-0.48, and the R2 of the regression is approximately 1%. These results suggest a weak and 
rather inconclusive mean-variance tradeoff in the one-regime scenario. In contrast, the 
estimates from the two-regime equation clearly distinguish two different patterns in the 
mean-variance dynamics, supporting the idea that investor sentiment affects this relation. In 
the low-sentiment periods, we observe a significant and positive relation between variance 
and expected returns (𝑏1 is 4.28 with a t-statistic of 3.18), while in the high-sentiment periods 
we find this relation to be radically different (𝑏1 + 𝑏2  is -1.26 with a t-statistic of -2.91). 
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Additionally, the two-regime equation has more descriptive ability than the one-regime 
equation, as R2 increases from 1% to 3%. 
Table 2. Excess returns against conditional variance in rolling window model  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the rolling window model regressions in BW sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 





2 ,                      (1) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the daily 
return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate 
number of days in one month. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 b1 + b2 R2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.01*** -0.39 




    
Two-regime 0.01** 4.28*** 0.00 -5.54*** -1.26*** 0.03 
  (2.04) (3.18) (-0.74) (-4.05) (-2.91) 
 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.01*** -0.92** 




    
Two-regime 0.00 2.46** 0.00 -3.75*** -1.29*** 0.02 
 
(1.33) (2.39) (0.43) (-3.62) (-4.16) 
 
              
In Panel B, we present similar results regarding the value-weighted returns. During 
low-sentiment periods the mean-variance tradeoff is 2.46 with a t-statistic of 2.39 and during 
high-sentiment periods the relation is -1.29 with t-statistic of -4.16. Again, the two-regime 
equation has more descriptive ability than the one-regime equation (higher R2). These results 
corroborate YY(2011) main hypothesis, in which we built upon to develop our work: 
investor sentiment seems to affect the mean-variance dynamics of  the market, 
compromising an otherwise positive tradeoff when sentiment is high. 
 The fact that we observe similar patterns with the value-weighted returns suggests 
that investor sentiment’s impact on the relation between variance and returns is also present 
on large-cap stocks, although its influence is stronger in small-cap stocks. This is consistent 
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with the literature. Glushkov (2005) shows that sentiment affects stocks of some firms more 
than others due to higher “sentiment beta”. BW (2007) predict that broad waves of 
sentiment will have greater effects on hard to arbitrage and hard to value stocks such as 
small, young, high volatility, unprofitable, non-dividend-paying, extreme-growth and 
distressed stocks. 
B. Mean–variance relation in GARCH (1,1) model 
Tables 3 reports the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with the 
GARCH (1,1) as the conditional variance model. BW investor sentiment is the sentiment 
measure used.  
Under the one-regime setting, the mean-variance relation, 𝑏, is positive and statistically 
significant for the GARCH model (𝑏 is 5.03 with a t-statistic of 2.96), which opposes to the 
relation we find with the rolling window model. Under the two-regime setting, again, we find 
different two-pattern evidence when compared with the rolling window model: although in 
low-sentiment periods, there is the same strong and statistically significant positive tradeoff 
between the mean and the variance of returns expressed in the coefficient 𝑏1 (𝑏1 is 5.55 with 
a t-statistic of 2.74), during high-sentiment we find a positive but weak, non-significant 
tradeoff (𝑏1 + 𝑏2 is 3.90 with a t-statistic of 0.72). In fact, the mean-variance slope, 𝑏1 + 𝑏2, 
is never significantly positive for our estimates, regardless of using equal- or value-weighted 
returns.  
Being nearly flat in all other cases, the mean-variance slope is only significantly 
negative if we choose the rolling window model as the conditional variance model (𝑏1 + 𝑏2 
is -1.26 with a t-statistic of -2.91 with equal-weighted returns, and equal to -1.29 with a         
t-statistic of -4.16 with value-weighted returns, as reported in Table 2). Thus, whilst both our 
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models suggest that sentiment influences the risk-return relation by distinguishing two 
different patterns where the positive relation is, at least, challenged, only the rolling window 
model captures with statistical and economic significance the impact of investor sentiment.  
Table 3. Excess returns against conditional variance in GARCH (1,1)  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the GARCH (1,1) model regressions in BW sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡),                     (2) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 ω x 103 α β b1 + b2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns 
One-regime -0.01 5.03*** 
  





(3.09) (4.97) (30.88) 
 Two-regime 0.00 5.55*** -0.01 -1.65 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.85*** 3.90 
 
(-0.39) (2.74) (-0.47) (-0.41) (3.00) (4.41) (28.66) (0.72) 
  Panel B: Value-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.00 3.39 
  





(2.00) (4.06) (26.28) 
 Two-regime 0.00 4.26** 0.00 -1.40 0.09** 0.11*** 0.85*** 2.86 
  (0.00) (2.13) (-0.28) (-0.27) (1.97) (3.97) (26.35) (0.37) 
 
The literature has long reported conflicting conclusions dependent on the 
methodology, especially on the conditional variance models used. Our results, however, are 
not incompatible across the volatility models used, if in the two-regime setting: there is a 
strong, significant positive mean-variance tradeoff in low-sentiment periods, but little if any 
in high-sentiment periods. The influence of investor sentiment in such periods sabotages an 
otherwise positive relation between return and risk. Although in line with YY (2011) main 
findings, our results do not indicate the same level of robustness across volatility models 
proposed by YY (2011). We find the same empirical conclusions in the value-weighted 
returns, which indicates that the impact of sentiment in large-cap stocks must not be 
overlooked. Even though its impact is stronger in small-cap stocks, investor sentiment seems 
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to affect all stocks in our sample. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe the predictive ability of the sentiment dummy 
(𝑎2). It is commonly believed that when investor sentiment is high (low), the stock market is 
overvalued (undervalued). Then, as sentiment eventually returns to its long-run mean, we 
expect prices to commove with sentiment, and in result, we expect a lower (higher) future 
return.  In our models, this intuition corresponds to the predictive ability of the sentiment 
dummy, 𝑎2, which is not significant in any of our estimates. According to our results, the 
predictive ability of the sentiment dummy is faint at the one-month horizon. This finding 
corroborates YY (2011), and is consistent with Brown and Cliff (2005) and Yuan (2005) who 
show that sentiment’s long-run ability to predict market returns is stronger than in the short-
run, due to sentiment’s high persistence.  
IV. Robustness checks 
This section reports the results of a range of robustness checks performed in this 
dissertation. We first examine whether the empirical results presented in the previous section 
hold for our alternative sentiment measure, MCSI, and alternative proxies of U.S. market 
returns. Following, we consider certain international evidence and study how investor 
sentiment influences the mean-variance tradeoff of five other stock markets. We also 
compare the performance of our sentiment measure to the one of several macro-economic 
variables. Lastly, we test a different GARCH-family model as an alternative to          
GARCH (1,1), namely the asymmetric GARCH (1,1). 6   
                                                        
6 The asymmetric GARCH (1,1) model was also employed to model volatility throughout all our work, 
including all robustness checks. The conclusions are of the same nature as the ones for the standard GARCH 
(1,1) model. We do not report them in this dissertation but they can be made available upon request. 
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A. U.S. market evidence 
i. Using alternative investor sentiment proxies 
In Section III we identify the prominent role of investor sentiment in the mean-
variance dynamics, and use BW sentiment index as a proxy for sentiment. To use an accurate 
sentiment proxy is understandably a critical factor in our work. We perform the same 
analysis presented in Section III using the MCSI index, described in Section II. Tables 4 and 
5 report the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with the rolling window and 
the GARCH (1,1) as the conditional variance models, respectively, and MCSI as the 
sentiment proxy. 7 
Under the one-regime setting, all the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions 
are equal to the ones from the BW sentiment regressions, since investor sentiment is not 
taken into account in this scenario. Therefore under this sentiment-free setting the mean-
variance relation, 𝑏, is positive and statistically significant for the GARCH (1,1), but negative 
and non-significant for the rolling window model. Under the two-regime setting, the rolling 
window model yields the same two-pattern evidence that we find with the BW index: in low-
sentiment periods, there is a strong and statistically significant positive tradeoff between the 
mean and the variance of returns expressed in the coefficient 𝑏1 (𝑏1 is 4.96 with a t-statistic 
of 3.75 and 7.45 with a t-statistic of 3.16 in the rolling window and in the standard GARCH, 
respectively), whereas during high-sentiment we find strong and statistically significant 
negative tradeoff with the rolling window but no significant relation with the GARCH (1,1) 
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2 is -1.50 with a t-statistic of -3.63 and 2.37 with a t-statistic of 0.40 in the rolling 
                                                        
7 Although we only present the sample period from January 1965 to December 2010 in Tables 4 and 5, we 
extended our sample for this particularly robustness check up to December 2014, since we do not face the 
same data availability constraints as with BW sentiment. The conclusions are of the same nature and can be 
made available upon request. 
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window and in the GARCH models, respectively). The predictive ability of the sentiment 
dummy (𝑎2) reveals to be faint at the one-month horizon, once again. 
Table 4. Excess returns against conditional variance in rolling window model 
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the rolling window model regressions in MCSI sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 





2 ,                      (1) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for MCSI high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the 
daily return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the 
approximate number of days in one month. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 b1 + b2 R2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.01*** -0.39 




    
Two-regime 0.00 4.96*** 0.01 -6.46*** -1.50*** 0.03 
  (0.45) (3.75) (1.02) (-4.82) (-3.63) 
 
 
Panel B: Value-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.01*** -0.92** 




    
Two-regime 0.00 2.83*** 0.01* -4.19*** -1.37*** 0.02 
 
(-0.15) (2.85) (1.89) (-4.26) (-4.49) 
 
              
 
The importance of investor sentiment to fully understand the relation between the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance of stock returns is deeply supported by our 
results. To use a market-based series or, alternatively, a consumer confidence measure as a 
proxy of investor sentiment leads us virtually to the same set of conclusions: sentiment 
distorts a tradeoff that would otherwise translate a positive and statistically significant 






Table 5. Excess returns against conditional variance in GARCH (1,1)  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the GARCH (1,1) model regressions in MCSI sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡),                     (2) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for MCSI high-sentiment periods. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels of the test statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 ω x 103 α β b1 + b2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns 
One-regime -0.01 5.03*** 
  





(3.09) (4.97) (30.88) 
 Two-regime -0.01* 7.45*** 0.02 -5.08 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.85*** 2.37 
 
(-1.74) (3.16) (1.26) (-1.22) (3.16) (4.59) (31.48) (0.40) 
  Panel B: Value-weighted returns 
One-regime 0.00 3.39 
  





(2.00) (4.06) (26.28) 
 Two-regime -0.01 7.42** 0.02* -7.90 0.09** 0.11*** 0.86*** -0.48 
  (-1.50) (2.09) (1.66) (-1.36) (2.05) (4.06) (28.75) (-0.05) 
 
ii. Using alternative U.S. returns proxies /U.S. stock indices 
The second robustness test we conduct considers different sock return indices as a 
proxy for U.S. stock market. Specifically, we run for the S&P 500 index, the DJIA index, and 
the Nasdaq 100 index the same empirical analysis as before, considering our main sentiment 
measure, the BW composite index, as the proxy for investor sentiment. 
We use CRSP returns for the S&P 500 index and Bloomberg returns for both the 
DJIA and the Nasdaq 100 indices, and the CRSP one-month T-bill returns as the interest 
rate. We use these data to compute excess market returns from January 1965 to December 
2010, which is the sample period for which we have values of BW (2006) sentiment index. 
Tables 6 and 7 report the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with the 
rolling window and the GARCH (1,1) as the conditional variance models, respectively.  
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Overall, none of the indices considered yield such significant results as the NYSE-
Amex index in a sentiment-free setting. Under the one-regime constraint, the results 
regarding the mean-variance tradeoff are neither conclusive nor consistent between the two 
models used.  
Table 6. S&P 500, DJIA and Nasdaq 100 excess returns against conditional variance in the rolling 
window model 
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the rolling window model regressions in BW sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 





2 ,                      (1) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the daily 
return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate 
number of days in one month. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 b1 + b2 R2 
 
Panel A: S&P 500 index (1965:2010) 
One-regime 0.01*** -0.42 




    Two-regime 0.00 3.20*** 0.00 -4.19*** -0.98*** 0.03 
 
(1.46) (3.56) (0.44) (-4.79) (-2.69) 
   Panel B: DJIA index (1965:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -0.78*** 




    Two-regime 0.00 1.30 0.00 -2.16 -0.86*** 0.01 
 
(0.23) (0.87) (0.01) (-1.40) (-3.34)   
  Panel C: Nasdaq 100 index (1985:2010) 
One-regime 0.01*** -1.27*** 




    Two-regime 0.01 2.76** 0.00 -4.01*** -1.25*** 0.06 
  (1.11) (2.30) (-0.18) (-3.17) (-3.41)   
 
In the two-regime scenario, results vary considerably between models. Regarding the 
rolling window model, all the three stock indices allow sentiment to show the same ability to 
distinguish two clear patterns identical to what we observe in Section III. The mean-variance 
tradeoff is statistically significant – except for the DJIA index – and positive in the low 




Table 7. S&P 500, DJIA and Nasdaq 100 excess returns against conditional variance in GARCH (1,1)  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the GARCH (1,1) model regressions in BW sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡),                     (2) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the different stock indices. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is 
the dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The 
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 ω x 10
3 α β b1 + b2 
 
Panel A: S&P 500 (1965:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 3.19 
  





(2.11) (3.93) (25.29) 
 Two-regime 0.00 4.77 0.00 -2.65 0.00** 0.11*** 0.85*** 2.13 
 
(-0.06) (1.42) (0.09) (-0.52) (2.06) (3.89) (25.17) (0.27) 
  Panel B: DJIA (1965:2010) 
One-regime 0.01 -4.63 
  





(12.77) (1.05) (-6.49) 
 Two-regime -0.02 9.74 0.06 -33.53 0.00*** 0.05 -0.73*** -23.79 
 
(-0.63) (0.64) (1.19) (-1.12) (8.76) (1.23) (-3.24) (-0.59) 
  Panel C: Nasdaq 100 (1973:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 1.40 
  





(1.73) (3.04) (11.35) 
 Two-regime -0.01 5.20* 0.01 -5.19 0.00* 0.12*** 0.82*** 0.01 
  (-0.56) (1.66) (0.73) (-1.39) (1.77) (2.95) (12.57) (0.00) 
 
the Nasdaq 100 index; t-statistics of 3.56, 0.87, and 2.30, respectively). During high-
sentiment times, we observe a strong, statistically significant negative relation in all cases 
(𝑏1 + 𝑏2 is -0.98 with a t-statistic of -2.69, -0.86 with a t-statistic of -3.34, and -1.25 with a    
t-statistic of -3.41 for S&P 500, DJIA and Nasdaq 100, respectively). 
When looking at the GARCH (1,1) estimates, none of the indices allow sentiment to 
show the same ability to differentiate the two patterns. In fact, there is no consistent 
significant pattern, especially for the high-sentiment regime.  
B. International evidence 
Next, we explore the following empirical question: Is U.S. BW composite measure 
able to present the same ability to explain the mean-variance dynamics in other international 
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stock exchanges? And if so, does it suggest a leading role for U.S. sentiment in the global 
economy? 
We explore data from Canada (SPTSX index), Germany (Dax index), France (CAC 40 
index), U.K. (FTSE 100 index), and Japan (Nikkei 225 index) and try to answer the question. 
We use Bloomberg monthly time-series of raw returns (as proxies for each stock market 
returns) and the CRSP one-month T-bill returns (as our risk-free measure), in order to 
compute excess market returns from January 1965 to December 2010, which is also the BW 
(2006) sentiment index sample period. Yet, due to data availability constraints, we use 
different sample periods starting at 1970 for Japan excess returns, 1977 for Canada excess 
returns, 1984 for U.K. excess returns, and 1987 for France excess returns.  
Table 8 accommodates the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with the 
rolling window model as the conditional variance model for each country’s returns. The 
rolling window model shows that BW sentiment is equally effective at playing a decisive role 
in the mean-variance tradeoff of all countries but Japan, showing statistically significant 
ability to identify clear two-pattern regimes. Results suggest that when sentiment traders 
have a greater influence in the U.S. stock exchange, these countries see the risk-return 
dynamics of their stock markets change dramatically. During periods of high investor 
sentiment in the U.S. market, these countries’ mean-variance tradeoff is negative with 
statistical and economic significance. Canada and U.K., as it could be expected, seem to be 
the markets under greater influence of American sentiment traders. During low-sentiment 
periods, the mean-variance relation is positive and significant, whereas such relation presents 
to be greatly distorted when American sentiment traders play the market. 
26 
 
GARCH (1,1), in turn, suggests BW sentiment to be little if any effective in all 
countries, with results being not significant and inconclusive.8  
Table 8. International excess returns against conditional variance in rolling window model  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the rolling window model regressions in BW sentiment 
regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 





2 ,                      (1) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on each stock market index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the daily 
return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate 
number of days in one month. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 b1 + b2 R2 
 
Panel A: Germany (1965:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -0.12 






 Two-regime 0.00 2.82* 0.00 -3.53** -0.72 0.01 
 
(-0.99) (1.78) (0.77) (-2.04) (-1.21) 
   Panel B: Canada (1977:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -1.15** 







Two-regime 0.00 3.10** 0.00 -4.42*** -1.32*** 0.03 
 
(1.18) (2.43) (-0.62) (-3.61) (-2.77) 
 
  Panel C: Japan (1970:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -0.21 







Two-regime 0.00 -0.28 0.00 0.09 -0.19 0.00 
 
(0.28) (-0.20) (-0.50) (0.06) (-0.96) 
 
  Panel D: United Kingdom (1984:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -0.63 







Two-regime 0.00 3.78*** 0.00 -4.73*** -0.95** 0.03 
 
(-0.30) (2.76) (0.47) (-3.23) (-2.34) 
 
  Panel E: France (1987:2010) 
One-regime 0.00 -0.65 







Two-regime 0.00 2.29* 0.00 -3.43** -1.15** 0.02 
  (-0.57) (1.71) (0.55) (-2.34) (-2.47)   
              
 
 
                                                        
8 We do not report the table with GARCH (1,1) estimates and test-statistics for this  robustness check, but it 
can be made available upon request. 
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C. Comparing sentiment with macro-variables 
It is widely discussed in sentiment literature the influence of business cycle variables 
upon any proxy of investor sentiment. One should bear in mind that both sentiment 
measures used in our work have been regressed on the growth in industrial production, the 
growth in durable, nondurable, and services consumption, the growth in employment, and 
on a flag for NBER recessions to control for macro-conditions, removing the effects of 
business cycle information. To compare the performance of a sentiment measure to the one 
of a macro-economic variable is thus a natural next step in our dissertation. 
We consider five macro-variables commonly used in literature and run the empirical 
tests described in Section IV, and compare each variable’s ability to distinguish two-pattern 
regimes to the results we obtain with BW composite index. We use the one-year T-bill return 
as our interest rate; the term premium, defined as the return difference between the 30-year 
and one-month T-bills; the default premium computed as the return difference between 
AAA and BAA corporate bonds; and the dividend-price ratio, calculated as the ratio of the 
total dividend to the market value of all stocks on the NYSE-Amex index. From the website 
of the Federal Reserve at St. Louis we downloaded the AAA and BAA corporate bonds data 
and the consumption data. The remaining data is available at CRSP. We build on the 
methodology we use with investor sentiment and separate our sample into two regimes, 
above or below the median of each macro-variable. We run the same regressions structure 
[equations (1) and (2)] and define the dummy variable, 𝐷𝑡 , is one for the low mean-variance 
regime. We define low-sentiment periods as periods in which the macro-variable’s level is 
below its median.  Tables 9 shows the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with 




The results are strongly conclusive and consistent across all macro-economic and for 
both variance models.9 Not a single one of the macro-variables could collect a set of equally 
coherent and stable results, which fully corroborates YY (2011) findings. Overall, investor 
sentiment seems to possess a unique capacity to deliver the two-regime pattern in a cohesive 
and reliable way.  
Table 9. Excess returns against conditional variance in rolling window model for macro-variables’ 
two-regime periods 
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the rolling window model regressions in macro-variables’ two-
regime periods:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 





2 ,                      (1) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the daily 
return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate 
number of days in one month. Tbill is the return on the one-year T-bill; Def spread is the return difference 
between AAA and BAA corporate bonds; Term spread is the return difference between the 30-year and one-
month T-bills; and D/P ratio is the ratio of the total dividend to the market value of all stocks on the NYSE-
Amex index. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels of the t-
statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 b1 + b2 R2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns 
Tbill 0.00 -0.57 0.01* 0.18 -0.38 0.01 
 
(1.08) (-0.82) (1.75) (0.14) (-0.34) 
 Def spread 0.01*** -0.50 -0.01 -0.81 -1.30 0.01 
 
(3.54) (-0.62) (-1.54) (-0.29) (-0.49) 
 Term Spread 0.01*** -0.66 -0.01** 2.09 1.43 0.01 
 
(4.78) (-0.84) (-2.32) (0.66) (0.47) 
 D/P ratio 0.00 -0.14 0.01 -1.67 -1.80 0.01 
 
(0.95) (-0.21) (1.54) (-0.50) (-0.98) 
   Panel B: Value-weighted returns 
Tbill 0.00 -1.01*** 0.00 0.11 -0.90 0.01 
 
(1.61) (-2.67) (0.79) (0.15) (-1.42) 
 Def spread 0.01*** -1.15*** -0.01** 1.97 0.82 0.01 
 
(3.57) (-3.05) (-2.20) (0.87) (0.37) 
 Term Spread 0.01*** -1.16*** -0.01** 2.49 1.32 0.02 
 
(4.41) (-3.10) (-2.52) (1.32) (0.71) 
 D/P ratio 0.00 -0.70** 0.01* -1.28 -1.98 0.02 
  (0.74) (-2.32) (1.93) (-0.57) (-0.85)   
 
 
                                                        
9 We do not report the table with GARCH (1,1) estimates and test-statistics for this  robustness check, but it 
can be made available upon request. 
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D. Trying an alternative GARCH model 
Additionally, we use the asymmetric GARCH (1,1) as an alternative to the GARCH 
(1,1) to perform robustness tests. Glosten et al. (1993) build an asymmetric GARCH model 
to allow different impacts from positive and negative residuals. The asymmetric GARCH 
(1,1) models the conditional variance as:   
 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛼2 𝐼𝑡 𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡), 
 
   (5) 
where 𝐼𝑡  is the dummy variable and takes the value one for positive shocks. 
Table 10 accommodates the estimates and test-statistics from the regressions with the 
asymmetric GARCH (1,1) as the conditional variance model, and BW sentiment as the 
sentiment proxy. 
Table 10. Excess returns against conditional variance in asymmetric GARCH (1,1)  
The table reports the estimates and t-statistics of the asymmetric GARCH (1,1) model regressions in BW 
sentiment regimes:  
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                     (3) 
𝑅𝑡+1 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝑎2𝐷𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐷𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡+1,                  (4) 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑡+1) = 𝜔 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑡𝜀𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡−1(𝑅𝑡),                   (5) 
Rt + 1 is the monthly excess return on the NYSE-Amex index. Vart(Rt + 1) is the conditional variance. Dt is the 
dummy variable for BW high-sentiment periods. rt-d is the daily demeaned NYSE-Amex index return (the daily 
return minus the within-month mean). Nt is the number of trading days in month t, and 22 is the approximate 
number of days in one month. Sample period is January 1965 to December 2010. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics from the Newey-West standard error estimator. ***, **, * denote a 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels of the t-statistics, respectively. 
 
Model a(a1) b(b1) a2 b2 ω x 103 α1 α2 β b1 + b2 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted returns   
One-regime -0.01 4.90* 
  





(2.91) (3.93) (-0.44) (28.97) 
 Two-regime 0.00 5.34*** -0.01 -1.53 0.19*** 0.11*** -0.03 0.84*** 3.81 
 
(-0.51) (2.96) (-0.94) (-0.63) (2.85) (3.60) (-0.86) (25.75) (0.99) 
  Panel B: Value-weighted returns   
One-regime 0.00 2.76 
  





(3.27) (3.52) (2.02) (34.43) 
 Two-regime 0.00 4.12*** 0.00 -0.32 0.08* 0.09*** 0.09* 0.85*** 3.80 
  (0.37) (5.36) (-0.53) (-0.08) (1.66) (3.47) (1.94) (24.61) (0.91) 
 
Under the one-regime setting, the mean-variance relation, 𝑏, is positive and statistically 
significant for the asymmetric GARCH (1,1) model (𝑏 is 4.9 with a t-statistic of 1.68), which 
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opposes to the relation we find with the rolling window model but is consistent to the 
standard GARCH model result. Under the two-regime setting, again, we find the same two-
pattern evidence we find in the GARCH (1,1): in low-sentiment periods, there is a strong 
and statistically significant positive tradeoff between the mean and the variance of returns 
expressed in the coefficient 𝑏1 (𝑏1 is 5.34 with a t-statistic of 2.96), whereas during high-
sentiment we find a positive but weak tradeoff (𝑏1 + 𝑏2 is -3.81 with a t-statistic of 0.99).  
The literature has long reported conflicting conclusions dependent on the volatility 
methodology, and especially on the conditional variance models used. Particularly, Glosten 
et al. (1993) find these contradictory results between the standard GARCH and the 
asymmetric GARCH. Our results, however, are robust across both GARCH models used.  
V. Conclusions 
This work contributes to the existing sentiment literature by presenting unequivocal 
evidence of the critical role investor sentiment plays on the mean-variance relation. We show 
that during high-sentiment periods investor sentiment undermines an otherwise positive 
mean-variance tradeoff. In low-sentiment periods, the common understanding holds that 
investors should obtain a compensation for bearing variance risk. Our results are aligned 
with the argument that there is a larger intervention and greater influence of sentiment 
traders in the markets when sentiment is high. We additionally add to the scarce international 
evidence existent in the sentiment literature, describing the same mean-variance tradeoff for 
five other countries, in which we suggest U.S. sentiment may have a leading role in the other 
countries’ stock markets and directly impact their dynamics. 
Our approach represents by construction a different mechanism for sentiment to 
commove with stock prices, when compared to the widely understood practices. Most 
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empirical works study its direct effects on prices, in which prices commove with investor 
sentiment. We show that sentiment rather affects the compensation for bearing variance risk 
first, and as result, price levels. 
This works contributes simultaneously to the extensive mean-variance literature. 
Although this has been such a thoroughly researched topic, there is no consensus on the 
nature of the tradeoff. By documenting that investor sentiment distorts the tradeoff in 
periods of high sentiment, we bring awareness to the need for models of stock prices that 
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